a small military force and not as a principal combatant but rather as an auxiliary

subordination to France. This fact was reflected in

to French our general military policy, which was

strategy of necessity one of great modesty and

almost complete subordination to that of France.

Our Army took its position side by side with the

French Army in defence of French soil, and as

our forces continued to grow, we proceeded to

take over more and more of the French line.

The modesty of our policy and the subordination

of our role to that of France have continued

notwithstanding the fact that during the last two

years the whole situation has been transformed

and we are now the principal opponent of the

Central Empires and the financial, naval and, to

a large extent, the military mainstay of the Entente.

This anomalous situation is now reflected in three

curious respects. . . .

The most serious result of all is that our whole

Army (with the exception of the Forces conducting

campaigns elsewhere) has been locked

Our need for up on the Western Front and we have

strategic reserve great strategic reserve left for any

unforeseen contingencies. For no doubt

good and sufficient reasons we have gradually

shouldered more and more of the burden of

defending France and so both the French and English Armies have become pinned down along the present Western Front. The Germans probably have great reserve forces which they could fling either against one of the existing fronts or into some new diversion into which they may be driven in order to achieve success. . . .